Tuesday, March 08, 2016

"Universal Basic Income"

Yesterday a brother sent me a link to A Plan in Case Robots Take the Jobs: Give Everyone a Paycheck - The New York Times
Their plan is known as “universal basic income,” or U.B.I., and it goes like this: As the jobs dry up because of the spread of artificial intelligence, why not just give everyone a paycheck?

Imagine the government sending each adult about $1,000 a month, about enough to cover housing, food, health care and other basic needs for many Americans. U.B.I. would be aimed at easing the dislocation caused by technological progress, but it would also be bigger than that.
My response is...well, yes and no. Bottom line: that's the right train of thought, but I don't think that it's quite the right track. We can do better.

I have favored a linear-tax scheme in the past, where by "linear" I just mean the familiar linear equation
y=m*x+b
or in this case
Tax=rate*income+base;
Say for extreme simplicity (with Congressionally-adjustable numbers) the government says: "You have a Social Security number? Okay, you have a bank account, and this one is for pre-tax money, like a 401(k). In it we deposit $100/week, your Supplemental Basic Income (small; makes no difference to a lot of people but a huge difference to others). Then we take 30% of everything you spend, i.e. everything that you move out of your pre-tax portfolio which can also include investments, savings, gifts, etc....if you deposit your paycheck into your pre-tax portfolio, that's exactly the 401(k) idea."

So, over the years, I've read Basic income arguments pro and con, starting with the ones that convinced me originally in Friedman's Capitalism and Freedom, roughly at The Libertarian Case for a Basic Income | Libertarianism.org or in Friedman's Firing Line interview at Milton Friedman - The Negative Income Tax - YouTube. I've found it pretty convincing.

Now we have a new kind of reason: geeks like me, developing the abilities of computers, are gradually making it (a) harder (at the median) and (b) less necessary (on the average) for people to earn a living in the traditional way. I've even written a bit about this recently, in the context of schools and the world that they're preparing our kids for, and I cited Pistono's Robots Will Steal Your Job, But That's OK | How to Survive the Economic Collapse and Be Happy, at HamiltonCentralOptions: SuperSchool
workers retiring this year at age 65 became high school students just about 50 years ago, in 1965. ...our total production, "real GDP", roughly tripled in that period... Manufacturing [jobs].... dropped from 25% to less than 10%, and we can expect the shrinkage to continue. The face of manufacturing is becoming the face of [robot] Baxter and his rapidly-improving successors...
Meanwhile, agriculture goes on "shrinking" in the same way: more stuff per person and much more output overall, but fewer people needed. ...

Does that mean higher unemployment? Not necessarily: it means that we produce the necessities of life with much less labor, so many more of our people will be producing goods and services, mostly services, which are not necessary for life....

And that leads into my current answer on the "Universal" or "Guaranteed" or "Supplemental" Basic Income proposal: we can do better than that. Specifically, the very information technology which pushes us towards a "yes" has a fundamental value for Great Gobs of Data; we can and should pay for that data, low pay (below minimum wage) at first but with increasing generosity as the years go by and we get richer overall. These are jobs for which anyone can qualify and make a genuine contribution to the Better World To Come.

What kind of jobs? Consider clinical trials as a model for social data collection. Everybody should be able to sign up for one of a large variety of studies, diet/exercise/social-interaction/education/long-term-low-dose-aspirin studies; these should pay people for their participation and ongoing feedback (via smartphone and associated sensors, as well as the sort of feedback that involves explicit clicks.) When an outcome is socially desirable, as in health and education, there should also be payment for achievement. In addition to these jobs, we should pay people for their perceptions, their knowledge, and even their opinions: Amazon product reviews add value to the world, Wikipedia edits add value to the world, YouTube tutorials add value to the world, this blog post probably doesn't but if there were a rating system with built-in rewards and AI protection against cheating, then the AI could find out if this blog post had added value to specific real people's worlds and it could assign rewards appropriately (both to the author and to the raters.)

And then we go off in many directions, of course...but we do so with more information, a broader base of understanding, than we would have had -- and we do so in a world where rewards come for having made a contribution to that world. Quite possibly we end up with an AI serving as the planetary village's Miss Marple, not the early-work gossip but the later version who sees all your public acts and some of what you thought was private, who can deduce a lot about your motivations (and in particular, what you gave up in order to do whatever you did and therefore what value your choice had for you). At that point we may simply drop our current insanity of "Intellectual Property" in which some of my thoughts belong to you whether I ever heard of you or not...



Or then again, maybe not.

update: An artistically inclined sister whose blog is probably more essential than this one asks via comment: "What? Art is not vitally essential?"
and that strikes me as one of the many questions that I don't want to answer for other people -- your customers in particular. My understanding is that many of them feel that life can be lived, or at least continued, without art -- and that means that art is a discretionary purchase, not "necessary for life" and therefore not recession-proof. Why Recession Isn't Good for Art -- New York Magazine
recessions mostly just yank young artists’ work off the walls. “If traditional art isn’t selling, galleries aren’t going to show emerging art.” ... In a boom, it’s cool to love art, see art, buy art. Art is taken seriously. A bust dismisses it as a luxury.
But my planetary Miss Marple would see that some people still wanted to look at, say, Raven With Shards, and you would receive credit -- spendable credit -- when they did so, even if they couldn't come up with the purchase price to own the original.

update 2, 20160610 A computationally inclined co-author suggests that I'm saying that "every human can get a job as a lab rabbit for AI", which is true in a way but
  1. I think this system would be workable now, with no more AI than we've got already: as I said, "Everybody should be able to sign up for one of a large variety of studies..." and in addition I'd try to reward reviews, edits, etc.... so I'd rather say that every human can get a job as a content creator/reviewer/editor/respondent.
  2. my hoped-for eventual AI wouldn't think of it that way. As I wrote more recently in A Small Note on Superintelligence Morality
    Intelligence needs to be attached to an actual person of some kind; a who not a what. This should not be called an artificial intelligence but rather an artificial person.
    .... The superintelligence need not be a biological homo sapiens, but does need to identify (correctly) as human, saying "we humans" not "you humans"; having human feelings, hopes and fears, including a feeling of membership in the human tribe. ...it is not a project of debugging a program. It's a project of raising a child, a psychologically healthy child -- yes, with parents, and preferably with siblings and so on outwards; a child who will realize that every h. sap. is one of his/her cousins.
    That's not the way we think about lab rats, or rabbits. (Although, in a sense, they are.)

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Monday, September 05, 2011

Health Care and the Experts: Financial Analogy?

Some co-author or other saw the Myers (fragment-of-a-) Health Care Plan which I put up last Easter, which started with

1. Allow unlicensed health care, wherever it's clearly labeled as such; it won't get public support but people can choose to spend their money on it. The argument against this is apparently that people will make bad choices. Yeah, some will, probably including me and you. So? I've never understood the way some people believe that they (or those they select) can make good choices for others; in fact I'm moderately cynical about licensure requirements as they are now structured, whether for medics or morticians or cosmetologists.
His comment says
I came to look at Chelyuskin but chanced upon healthcare. Your item 1 is the only time I can remember when I totally disagree with you. You say: Some people will make bad choices including you and me. This equates mistakes by poor slobs who lost their houses and livelihoods in 2008 with "mistakes by TJM," that same TJM who, I suspect, belongs to that tiny minority who made money in 2008, because he has both sharp analytical mind and enough money to hire a top-notch money manager. Besides, this just won't work politically: as soon as a poor slob somewhere takes her child to an unlicensed healer, and the child ends up with an amputated limb, the outcry for regulation will be irresistible and, IMHO, justified.
I wasn't sure how to respond to this money-management analogy, and I let it go; I'll give it a try now...

I'm astonished -- and encouraged, because I would not have expected item 1 to be the only total disagreement even in this post, much less in general. And of course it's possible that I'm totally wrong...but I haven't changed my mind yet. Let's take it one step at a time.

The first point of disagreement, a very big one: No, I didn't make money in 2008. In fact in September 2009 I said

I haven't posted for a long time, but it's not that I haven't made any mistakes. Indeed, I've participated to some extent in one of the biggest mistakes of my lifetime -- the market crash of 2008.

Personally, I did see the bubble as such, earlier than some...
In fact I lost much less than I might have because (like my "top-notch money manager" -- I must remember to tell him about that description) I was expecting a downturn at some unpredictable point Real Soon, a small-to-middling wealth-effect recession whenever the bubble popped, and also of course because I avoided real estate. But I did lose, because we weren't expecting what happened. Was this an issue of expertise, in any useful sense of that term? People with far greater expertise than mine, including both the then-current and currently current heads of the Federal Reserve, were denying the problem -- even denying the limited problem that I saw then. (Indeed, since a big part of the problem was excessive risk-taking -- i.e. excessive confidence -- I think those public statements contributed to our still-continuing doldrums in addition to the policy errors I believe they made.) There were indeed a very few people who actually made money by understanding a part of what was going on: a short-seller named Eisman was quoted in late 2008 in The End Of Wall Streets Boom
“We always asked the same question,” says Eisman. “Where are the rating agencies in all of this? And I’d always get the same reaction. It was a smirk.” He called Standard & Poor’s and asked what would happen to default rates if real estate prices fell. The man at S&P couldn’t say; its model for home prices had no ability to accept a negative number. “They were just assuming home prices would keep going up,” Eisman says.
S&P denies that; I haven't heard any coherent excuses for the way they performed as the Supreme Appointed Financial Experts of the American economy (co-equal with Fitch and Moody's, of course). I dunno. Still it's my understanding that Eisman made money whereas on the average, people with more to lose (them with money managers) lost more, disproportionately more, than those with less. That's a Good Thing, as far as it goes -- it didn't go as far as it should because of Too-Big-To-Fail, i.e. some high-income people had their losses made good at the average guy's expense -- but it doesn't fit well with a belief that experts protect us from making disastrous mistakes. As I said in that Sept 2009 post, "To a disturbing extent, I think expertise in (macro)economics has been discredited. I don't believe this is adequately answered by Greg Mankiw's [remarks about economics being non-predictive]". I agree with parts of Brad DeLong's remarks a few days ago in What To Do About Jobs? that
given that most of what we macroeconomists were saying in 2007 was wrong, what, if anything, do we have to say today? Bear in mind that what turns out to have been wrong was pretty much everything that had been done since 1950....
Well, with part of it. As the the Economist (Ryan Avent) said last week,
The narrow point to focus on, however, is that the story in which the housing bust gave us the recession, because America suddenly had lots of houses and workers it couldn't use doesn't appear to fit the data. The economy muddled on despite the housing bust for two years, at which point, for some reason, all sectors suddenly decided that the outlook for growth was much worse than they'd previously believed.
As he says, that fits the Scott Sumner story I've blogged about before, which can be read as very conventional textbook macro and which blames most of the recession on the experts of the Federal Reserve, who simply did the wrong thing in a big way. (There's still room for other blames, of course.) On a more micro-economic level, I'd say that expert stock-picking advice is also of dubious value: I'm a moderate believer in a very weak form of the efficient-market hypothesis, and if this country were to adopt a deduction-free progressive consumption tax system (which it should do on grounds of efficiency/fairness/sanity) I would almost certainly stop using a money manager -- the money-manager's value is rather strongly dependent on his understanding of a complex system that really shouldn't exist. (Also dependent on the fact that his services are mostly deductible, i.e. you're helping to pay. Thanks!) What would I do then? I would switch to a passive management pattern, which in pure investment terms is at least as good and likely better:
In the United States, indexed funds have outperformed the majority of active managers, especially as the fees they charge are very much lower than active managers. They are also able to have significantly greater after-tax returns.
Most of my decisions would then have to do with asset allocation:
The conclusion of the study was that replacing active choices with simple asset classes worked just as well as, if not even better than, professional pension managers. Also, a small number of asset classes was sufficient for financial planning.
Hooray for Malkiel! And for Samuelson and Bogle!. This doesn't prove that financial expertise is worthless, but I don't think it has the kind of value you're suggesting.

Let me put it this way:

  • Failure to consult such an expert now and then is really stupid. There are a lot of things a financial specialist knows that are not intuitive; important things.
  • Many of these are routine things, how to file this-and-that.
  • Many of these are simple things you really ought to learn yourself (why it probably makes sense to own more bonds and fewer stocks as you get older, etc. etc. etc.)
  • Some of the others are simply not true, and we don't know which until it's too late (why the top tranche of a pile of mortgage-backed securities deserves its AAA rating, etc. etc.)
  • Unlimited trust for your expert is not wise.
  • Compulsory obedience to your expert is a really really bad idea, which fortunately is not employed except for the way that S&P and the other experts are embedded in the laws about risk ratings, which effectively required banks to invest in disastrous mortgage-backed securities...
  • Perhaps the most important financial skill you can have is that by which you evaluate an expert; nobody else can do this for you, but certification and track-record-checking and recommendations are all important.

Your analogy between medical and financial services is not one that would have occurred to me, but it may have merit. Failure to consult an actual medical expert now and then is really stupid. Medical specialists do indeed know a lot of unintuitive things. Many of these are routine. Many are things you should learn for yourself. Many are false. Trust is a good thing, unlimited trust is a bad thing, compulsory obedience is a really bad thing. Certification and track-record and recommendations...yup. Okay, I'll take the analogy. :-)

Seriously, I think you're saying, effectively, that

If there's one seriously bad (but non-fatal) outcome from an unlicensed healer, public outcry will correctly push us back to requiring licensure
It seems to me you're forgetting something: the licensed doctors we have now are responsible for some 100,000 fatal errors per year (perhaps a little less, perhaps a lot more; see Wikipedia.) Those deaths are on top of a death-toll which I believe to be very much larger: deaths caused by the FDA's prevention of innovation. I'd suggest reading one article, Theory, Evidence and Examples of FDA Harm by Tabarrok and Klein:
Three bodies of evidence indicate that the costs of FDA requirements exceed the benefits. In other words, three bodies of evidence suggest that the FDA kills and harms, on net...
Or you might prefer The FDA: Neither Safe nor Effective ending with a Friedman quote:
“‘The FDA has already done enormous harm to the health of the American public by greatly increasing the costs of pharmaceutical research, thereby reducing the supply of new and effective drugs, and by delaying the approval of such drugs as survive the tortuous FDA process.’ When asked, if you could do anything to improve health in America, what would you do? Friedman replied: ‘No more licensing of doctors. No more regulation of drugs. Not of any kind. Period.’”
Actually, I don't quite agree, but my position is a whole lot closer to Friedman's than to anything that's likely to happen, and I'd accept his as being substantially better than what we have now. (And if we magically went to his, I like you and most others would go right on consulting a conventional MD -- but the MD I consulted might not be in the US. It might depend on what happened to the insurance industry, which would now be free to sell the sort of insurance policy that I'd want to buy.)

Or then again, maybe not.

Update:Stiglitz, Nobel Prize-Winning Economist, Says Federal Reserve System 'Corrupt' according to the Puffington Host:


To Stiglitz, the core issue is that regional Fed banks, such as the New York Fed, have clear conflicts of interest -- a result of the banks being partly governed by a board of directors that includes officers of the very banks they're supposed to be overseeing.

The New York Fed, which was led by current Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner during the time leading Wall Street firms like Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase, AIG, and Goldman Sachs were given hundreds of billions of dollars in taxpayer bailouts, presently has on its board of directors Jamie Dimon, the head of JPMorgan Chase. He's been there for three years. He replaced former Citigroup chairman Sanford "Sandy" Weill.

"So, these are the guys who appointed the guy who bailed them out," Stiglitz said. "Is that a conflict of interest?" he asked rhetorically.
That really might explain the Fed's behavior... in finance as in medicine, the incentives of regulatory capture and crony capitalism apply. People who exert government's influence are always going to be pushed towards exerting it in favor of those who can exert influence on their behalf, and regulation -- especially licensure, as the power to say who can't compete with you -- is always going to be a Very Good Thing from the point of view of those who have a seat at the table. They may even sincerely believe that they are the only true experts, and that those who do things differently are simply not good for the public. (Or then again, maybe not.)

Update, June 13: In the end, the wealthiest did lose proportionately less from the recession: CONVERSABLE ECONOMIST: Wealth by Distribution, Region, and Age says:

Those in the 90-100th percentiles of the wealth distribution have median wealth of $1,864,000, and mean wealth of $3,716,000 in 2010. That's also the part of the wealth distribution that had the smallest percentage decline in the median and the mean from 2007 to 2010.
I believe that, and I suppose it might have something to do with financial advice, but my current reaction is simply that housing was the most overvalued part of the economy, and those below the top 90% had more of their wealth in housing--and were more likely to have to use up their savings due to job losses in the family. I don't think it has any implications for the health-care analogy.

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Sunday, July 31, 2011

Two Hundred Trillion Dollars

There are some silly songs on Youtube about the $46,000 debt we're giving each new child at birth; the songs are supposed to make you feel guilty about what we're doing to our children, and I think they're supposed to energize you against the debt-ceiling rise and for the balanced budget amendment. Well, the debt ceiling is stupid, and the balanced budget amendment is a really bad idea, and $46,000 is a ludicrous figure; the correct figure, the figure that the average kid needs to pay (or pay interest on, or pass on with accrued interest to the next generation,) is probably well over half a million. Nobody can know exactly; it depends on future growth of expenses and revenues and population, but $46,000 is a very small fraction of the total.

In April 2010, after the health-care bill's passage, I wrote a "One Hundred Trillion Dollars" context post in which I quoted the Dallas Fed:

Add together the unfunded liabilities from Medicare and Social Security, and it comes to $99.2 trillion over the infinite horizon. Traditional Medicare composes about 69 percent, the new drug benefit roughly 17 percent and Social Security the remaining 14 percent. ... all we would have to do to fully fund our nation’s entitlement programs would be to cut discretionary spending by 97 percent....defense and national security, education, the environment ... All of them [forever]
Today I noticed on Yahoo a more up-to-date and more complete and therefore more scary view of the same concept, from BusinessWeek, in Why the Debt Crisis Is Even Worse Than You Think:
A more revealing calculation is the CBO’s measurement of what’s called the fiscal gap. That figure is conceptually cleaner than the national debt—and consequently more alarming. Boston University’s Kotlikoff has extended the agency’s analysis from 2085 out to the infinite horizon, which he says is the only method that’s invulnerable to the frame-of-reference problem. It’s an approach used by actuaries to make sure that a pension system doesn’t contain an instability that will manifest itself just past the last year studied. Years far in the future carry very little weight, converging toward zero, because they are discounted by the time value of money. Even so, Kotlikoff concluded that the fiscal gap—i.e., the net present value of all future expenses minus all future revenue—amounts to $211 trillion.

How does that work? Well, let's think about the Smith family and the Jones family, each expecting the same future expenses spread out over time. Joe Jones intends to pay as he goes; he hasn't borrowed anything. Sam Smith has borrowed enough money from a bank to fund an investment account which will pay exactly the same expenses. In fact, aside from the issue of bank profit, he had to borrow exactly the net present value of those future expenses. (He has a triple-A rating, of course. For now.) You can think of various ways that they're in different situations, but the Smith and Jones families are basically comparable: the payments on Smith's loan will not over time be appreciably different from Jones' direct expenses. So we can think of both of them as having the same financial future: if one is in trouble, they both are. And right now, the US has the same financial future as if it had made no unfunded promises but had borrowed a grand total of $211,000,000,000,000.00. So far.

Is that exact? No, of course not. Things might not be quite that bad, they could be even worse: as the article says, the calculation is quite sensitive to assumptions about future events and policy. But it's accurate enough to say that the "debt" is not what we should worry about; we should worry about the "fiscal gap".

Of course, if you worry about the debt, then it makes sense to talk about the deficit: $850 billion dollars last year. What if you're worried about the fiscal gap? Does the deficit become irrelevant? Yes, really; as Kotlikoff says:

The gap was $205 trillion last year, measured in today’s dollars. That’s an increase of $6 trillion. ... Hence, the real deficit we should be worrying about is more than six times larger than the $850 billion official deficit capturing all the attention.
In other words, Congress and the president’s administration could agree to run a balanced budget, making this year’s official deficit zero, and the nation’s true indebtedness would still rise by $5.15 trillion!... the main reason is that we are one year closer to having to pay 78 million baby boomers roughly $40,000, on average, per year in Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid benefits. Because the fiscal gap is a discounted present value, one year makes a big difference.

If you think back to the Smith and Jones family, and imagine the fiscal gap as an implicit debt, then the $5 trillion is mainly the result of our failure to pay even the interest on the $206 trillion we owed last year -- we do have a really good interest rate as long as we keep the AAA rating, but it's not zero.

So, should we balance the budget anyway, even if it's inadequate to do so? No -- not in years with high unemployment. I'd agree with Calculated Risk: Debt Ceiling Update

A politician can say "We should have a balanced budget". It sounds good, but why aren't they challenged about operating vs. capital budgets? And about business cycle spending (obviously revenue falls during a recession - and spending increases)?
What they really want is a balanced operating budget over the business cycle. You can't put that in the Constitution. It requires effective government and constant vigilance.
But even capital vs. operating budget doesn't quite do it for me: I want the fiscal gap, over the business cycle, to remain a limited multiple of GDP. Fifteen times GDP? Okay, fifteen times GDP. (It would be nice to shrink it.) But don't let it keep growing (as a multiple of GDP) from one business-cycle peak to the next.

And with all that, should my taxes be raised? Yes, emphatically so -- my taxes should be raised as part of a plan to deal with the fiscal gap. I can and should pay more taxes than most people; that part's understood. I'm not in Kerry's league for lifetime income, not even in Obama's, but I can pay more taxes than I do -- it won't even cut my consumption until taxes get quite a lot higher. What I don't think most raise-taxes people understand is that even though a fairly substantial tax hike won't be a "hardship", won't seriously cut my consumption, it will cut my reinvestment. It has to. So it will reduce the money available to future generations of taxers; in fact a dollar of tax revenue increase now is somewhat more than a dollar of tax revenue decrease later, because you'll have spent the money before it grew. So it's crucial, when you take my money, to take it as part of a plan to deal with the fiscal gap--otherwise the gap grows and you've taken some of the resources we'll need to deal with it. (I tried to go over this in the aforelinked One Hundred Trillion Dollars post.) In any case, if you actually want to fix things, focus on consumption, not income. (I'll still pay more than average, I promise.)

And is it hopeless? Not at all. We still see, e.g. Foxconn to replace workers with 1 million robots in 3 years. We still see Sarcos Exoskeleton Bringing Iron Man Suit Closer To Reality and the beautiful Watch Festo's SmartBird Robot Soar Over TED Conference. We still see Loss of memory due to aging may be reversible and, for young and old, How Khan Academy Is Changing the Rules of Education. We may even see Could 100 Kilometer high towers usher in the next space age?

The SpaceShaft concept isn't as ambitious as the space elevator but it is much more feasible. For 130 million Euros we could design and construct a 100 kilometer tall SpaceShaft within a decade. Once we have SpaceShafts up and running, the frontier of space will finally be open to humanity.

Or then again.... maybe not.

update: Fixed silly typo which had billions instead of trillions.

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Saturday, July 23, 2011

Thoughts on Greece, and us

A large part of what holds Greece back, and us as well, is fairly described as rent-seeking--manipulation of public power for private profit, one way or another. In Greece, as in the Latin America of my childhood, it's much more likely to take the form of simple corruption: imagine (as I was told in Greece last week) an underpaid government official who approves environmental permits, and who provides faster service for those who provide extra money. And then he slows down the uncompensated permits sharply, to encourage the trade. It's not that he is lazy or works few hours, it's not even that there are too many such officials -- all that is often said but seems to be wrong. It's simply that his work product tends to detract from actual GDP, even as it's added at "cost" to official GDP. If he weren't doing that, Greece would be richer.

Other kinds of rent-seekers include those who profit from government-imposed monopolies, like the Athens taxi-drivers now striking, unpredictably blocking port and airport. Rent-seeking is a pretty broad category in my mind. I suppose that all countries end up with issues of regulatory capture and indeed of crony capitalism; government makes rules, and these rules will tend to promote the interests of those who have something to offer to the rule-makers, or some credible threat they can make. That interest-promotion is "rent," paid to the people who've managed to make some government power into their own property, legally or not.

I spent last week on Spetses, with various extended-family events relating to my granddaughter's baptism. It's interesting and educational to listen to Greeks and Greek-Americans talking about their fiscal crisis; I'd hoped to get some time specifically listening to Yannis Ioannides and Anna Hardman, and did, but not enough for real understanding. Yannis' basic Greece-is-not-bankrupt statement surprised me considerably (see Ioannides Says Greece Not Bankrupt, Must Change Economy: Video - Bloomberg). He thinks Greece really can pay its debts -- and he thought that even before the ’Restricted Default’ deal of this week, so I presume he thinks his case has been strengthened. He's an advocate for the austerity measures, which I suppose makes him one of the Serious People of whom Paul Krugman said this week in 1937! 1937! 1937! - NYTimes.com that

OK, so we’re going to demand harsh austerity in the debt-crisis countries; and meanwhile, we’re also going to have austerity in the non-debt-crisis countries. Plus, the ECB is raising rates. So demand will be depressed in both crisis and non-crisis economies; this will lead to a vigorous recovery through … what? The Serious People are determined to destroy all the advanced economies in the name of prudence.
I'm mostly on Krugman's side there; we're combining monetary policy from the ECB which may be reasonable for Germany but not for Greece, along with drastic contractions of an uncomfortably the-beatings-will-continue-until-morale-improves flavor. Or so it seems to me. But Yannis isn't supporting austerity to reassure bond markets as Krugman says; Yannis thinks that the "austerity" (including the deregulation of taxi medallions being protested) is part of breaking or at least limiting the rent-seeking system. Well, I'm not sure he or Anna ever said "rent-seeking" but that's my understanding of what they did say, and when I look for related material online I find things like BusinessInsider's querying a member of the `professional "elite" class' of Greece, who said
We want the Greek economy reformed. An end to the of unimaginable waste of taxpayers money,...cronyism and corruption. A much smaller and reformed public sector... A pursuit and prosecution of presently wide spread tax evasion practices. The above would immediately provide us with a considerable primary surplus, enabling us to keep repaying our debt, an obligation we wish to honour. ... Unfortunately it appears that the average Greek, does not view things the same way.
That certainly sounds like the viewpoint of the Greeks with whom I spoke. And how big is the corruption problem? Well, Transparency International said
The Greeks paid an average of €1,355 ($1,830) in bribes [in 2009] for public services such as speeding up the issue of driver's licenses and construction permits, getting admitted to public hospitals or manipulating tax returns, ... Bribes paid for private sector services such as lawyers, doctors or banks were even higher...
So really, Yannis and those he supports (to the extent that I understand what's going on here) are not so much engaged in economics as in political action aimed at restructuring Greek culture. Otherwise, the bailouts fail. In The Painful Arithmetic of Greek Debt Default | e21 - Economic Policies for the 21st Century I see
How does corruption limit the capacity for tax and spending reform? Tax avoidance, which relies on bribery to avoid prosecution, is a national pastime in Greece – the envelope used in the bribe even has its own name, the “fakelaki,” confirming the age-old adage that the Greeks “have a word for it.” Bribery is so rampant in Greece that real estate developers’ method of obtaining cheap land is to burn down public land, squat on the burned parcels, and pay off public officials to permit this. Greece’s forest fires, particularly in the Peloponnese in 2007, have been a source of public outrage for years, and yet the developers continue to squat on the land with impunity. Is a society that permits that sort of lawlessness capable of tax reform?
Maybe. Maybe not. I respect Yannis, but if the average Greek doesn't believe in it to begin with, I don't see a happy ending to this story.

Corruption is by no means the only problem, and an end to rent-seeking would not necessarily make Greece fit comfortably into the Eurozone. Clearly, little Greece will never be the target of the ECB's monetary policy. Krugman, in Anatomy of a Euromess, said that

Spain’s troubles are not, despite what you may have read, the result of fiscal irresponsibility. Instead, they reflect “asymmetric shocks” within the eurozone, which were always known to be a problem, but have turned out to be an even worse problem than the euroskeptics feared.
David Beckworth took Krugman's analysis and extended it in "Optimal Currency Area" terms within Eurozone Periphery and the Euro, saying
If a region’s economy is not in sync with the currency union’s business cycle and the above listed shock absorbers ("flexible wages and prices, factor mobility, fiscal transfers, and diversified economies") are absent then it does not makes sense for a country to be a part of the currency union. Instead, the country should keep its own currency which itself will act as a shock absorber.
It's no great surprise to see that in his graphs, Greece ends up as the most ill-placed. But I believe that part of the "austerity" program is intended to increase the flexibility of the job market (by pruning job protection programs, as has been tried before) and maybe, if the austerity programs are accepted, maybe things will work out. For a while. Public Pensions and Labor Force Participation: The Case of Greece
The pension system of Greece is a representative case of the “Mediterranean welfare state”, which is characterized by extensive segmentation, very high payroll tax rates, and yet inadequate pension benefits. In order to explain this paradox we construct an economic–demographic model. We show that in the period 1980–2000, the segmentation of the system and the very low labor force participation rates of the Greek economy have resulted in very high payroll tax rates in relation to the current level of benefits. On top of these problems, the expected adverse demographic developments in the period 2005–2050 will render the pension system completely unsustainable.

Still, the near-term need is to cut the rent-seeking (including corruption) and collect the taxes and shrink the regulatory/welfare state. Maybe. And can it be done? Well, my own approach in Greece, even more than in the US would be:

automate, eliminate, simplify, outsource.
Almost all of a government's functionality should be virtual... Well, maybe I will make a separate post about that, sometime.

Meanwhile, a little more time has been bought. The Economist remarks that

the biggest risk to the euro zone is that its leaders will begin thinking that they've solved the problem. As growth figures worsen in coming months, markets will once again become antsy. Euro-zone officials had better be preparing for a way to convince them anew that they want this thing to work.

And I go back to the pattern I established last winter, of exercise and education

This morning I spent 45 minutes trying to pound a few modern Greek words and phrases into an aging memory; until a month ago, this would have required a major effort of willpower, but lately I've been doing it every day with no problem...
As I commented to my son's mother-in-law, see-gah-see-gah mah-THAY-no, which I think means "little by little I'm learning;" since her response was "bravo, Tom, ah-krih-VOS!" (precisely), maybe it does. And maybe I will eventually learn some economics too. Or then again, maybe not.

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Saturday, April 23, 2011

It's all about healthcare. Well, and signaling.

This afternoon I was sitting in the third row, right behind the woman who placed the winning bid -- $13,000 -- on the auction of Harry Potter's bow tie. Well, of J. Pierpont Finch's bow tie, Finch being the lead character of How to Succeed in Business Without Really Trying; Finch is played by Daniel Radcliffe, a talented young actor/singer/dancer (well, a bit weaker as a dancer, I thought, but I'm no judge) who will probably be plagued for the rest of his life by people who can't help but think of him as Harry Potter. And he and his co-star were trying to raise money for a Good Cause, namely healthcare, after the performance. (Okay, a specific healthcare cause, but I'm still fussing about healthcare in general.) So....

So I would call the winning bid rather impressive; I think most people would. Radcliffe commented that we were "well over the record", some time before the auction closed---I presume he does this with a fresh bow tie for each performance. But I couldn't help but be reminded of the cost of my own appendectomy, not quite a year ago: it was in fact a little over the bow tie's price. Consider what that audience pays for healthcare each year...the auction was a Good Thing to Do, an Exercise in Nobility, a demonstration of the Brotherhood of Man (that being the last song&dance) but as a contribution to healthcare it was a teaspoonful in a lake.

Yes, I understand that's not the point. It's not really about healthcare, even healthcare is not really about healthcare. Robin Hanson put it rather well, some time ago, in his argument that it's about Showing That You Care:

I can explain these puzzles moderately well by assuming that humans evolved deep medical habits long ago in an environment where people gained higher status by having more allies, honestly cared about those who remained allies, were unsure ... These ancient habits would induce modern humans to treat medical care as a way to show that you care. Medical care provided by our allies would reassure us of their concern, and allies would want you and other allies to see that they had pay enough to distinguish themselves from posers who didn’t care as much as they.

That makes sense to me as the beginning of a model, and it certainly isn't a criticism of the woman who paid so much for the bow tie. She evidently does care, and presumably cares that it's evident that she cares, and that's a good thing.

Nonetheless, if you want to use healthcare provision to show you care, I think it would be a good idea to spend some time looking for actual ways to provide actual healthcare; a few more teaspoons of water in the lake won't do it. So I'd like to go back over my proposal of a bit more than a year ago. I'd organize it a bit differently now, but I don't seem to have moved all that far.

If I were (heaven forfend) In Charge, I would crowd-source as much as possible of the decision-making by pushing it into a market, with participants being given as much data for decision-making as possible, and being simultaneously milked for as much data as possible. I want incentives for innovation, to reduce the death-rate for billions yet unborn; I also want incentives for good performance now, not for the sort of regulatory capture our current system maximizes. Specifically I would:

  1. Allow unlicensed health care, wherever it's clearly labeled as such; it won't get public support but people can choose to spend their money on it. The argument against this is apparently that people will make bad choices. Yeah, some will, probably including me and you. So? I've never understood the way some people believe that they (or those they select) can make good choices for others; in fact I'm moderately cynical about licensure requirements as they are now structured, whether for medics or morticians or cosmetologists.
  2. Require transparent pricing, uniform no-bargaining pricing, from all providers of licensed health care. (The services producing my appendectomy really don't do this.)
  3. Require that "licensing" be independent of geography; if the best/cheapest supplier of a particular treatment is two states over or on another continent, that's fine. As I've said before, I believe that telepresence medicine can enable the specialization and trade that has made markets work in other contexts since before Adam Smith wrote about it, so I expect this as the usual case, not an exception.
  4. Take away the employer-based tax exemption; health care shouldn't be an employment issue.
  5. Add a universal tax-funded "insurance" policy (insulation, actually): if your expenditures for "proven procedures" from licensed health care providers exceed the overall 16% (of GDP) average, then the taxpayers contribute some. Maybe if your cost is 30% of your income, then the taxpayers kick in (30-16)/2=7%, half of the overage, and the maximum you can pay is 50% of your income whether that's $0/year or $10M/year. Is that too generous? Not enough? I dunno. The point is to combine protection from catastrophe (but not from serious pain) with making sure that market prices are set by people or groups who are actually bargaining in that market, i.e. the better-off people for whom procedure X will not be covered. I want to do that combination with some simple, less-than-perfect-but-better-than-nothing rule with which I can trust a government. (Democrats and Republicans trust government on different things; just figure you want a better-than-nothing rule with which you'd trust a politician of the party you despise.)
  6. If you want "unproven procedures" and you can pay for them, that's fine too; the licensed health care providers should have a strong motive to come up with new stuff and document/publish that it works. The FDA should not be able to keep you from paying for these likely-to-fail treatments, but it should keep you from charging it to the rest of us. If procedure X has no accepted studies supporting it, then it's up to you to pay for it.
  7. Whatever additional insurance/insulation you want to buy for proven or unproven procedures is just fine, and can be bought across state lines. It's your problem. You want to save your money in a special bank account? Feel free.
  8. Any care that has been paid or partly paid by public funds goes into an anonymized public database, so that we learn more about which treatments have what effects on which conditions. Organizations promoting not-yet-approved treatments will be encouraged to contribute data.
And that's really it, for me. I'm even less confident of this than I was when I wrote the first version, but I still don't see anything else I like as well. I think that the market I'm describing would probably evolve rather quickly into a market in which people choose and buy packaged health plans from "insurance" agents, and web sites build up crowd-sourced ratings of those health plans; there would be quite a bit of overlap with the better parts of what we have now. I hope. And I care, and I suppose I'd like to signal that I care.

Or then again, maybe not.

update:I never actually mentioned that this post was prompted by thinking about Mark Thoma's Economist's View: Discussion Question: How Can We Reduce the Growth of Health Care Costs?

there is far too much discussion of cutting services, and not enough about how to control costs without affecting services (e.g., using the government's purchasing power to reduce the amount the government pays for drugs, reducing the cost of insurance companies fighting over who pays bills, etc.)
You see, I doubt the premise: if you use government power as I believe Thoma wants, you are increasing the incentives for regulatory capture, crony capitalism, rent-seeking... you are putting yourself on a path where you have signaled your concern but healthcare is not what you're rewarding. Of course government power needs to be used -- to collect the money for treatments which research results say are crucial and which markets say are expensive. And government power needs to be used to maintain a context for innovation (rather than squelch it, as I believe our recent trends in "intellectual property" law tend to do.) But if bargaining-on-prices-with-the-government is the multi-billion$ activity you focus on, then that's what companies will have to invest in. That's a bad bad bad bad thing. I commented here.

Well, it's Easter morning. Maybe we're all saved?

Or then again, maybe not.

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Sunday, January 02, 2011

The Greenspun Recovery Plan: November 2008

My co-author, rather than updating his Project Afghanistan page for 2010, sends me a link to Philip Greenspun's Economic Recovery Plan -- minimum steps for averting a Depression in the U.S. , with a note that I "will probably find this congenial", probably meaning that it's closer to my views than his, but interesting. So I look at the minimum steps as of two years ago for averting a Depression in the US, and the first thing I notice is that we didn't do those things and we didn't get a Depression, so they weren't minimal steps for avoiding a Depression. QED. (I think we avoided a Depression because the Fed wasn't quite as stupid as it was in the 30s, but I've probably talked about that enough and Greenspun never mentions it.) Greenspun says the minimal steps are
Reducing Government Spending In 2006 we were spending roughly 36 percent of GDP on government at local, state, and federal levels ... We need to [reduce] government spending to 30 percent of GDP within two years and ...
Well, actually I often think about this measure of the size of government; I don't like it much, especially when transfer payments are most of government spending, and ultra-especially when the big transfers like SocSec and Medicare are going to older people, who have other income, sometimes more income than the younger ones, and are also taxpayers. Government salaries are hardly more than a rounding error here. Let's say my income this year is $100 and yours is $10; the government takes $40 from me, carefully evaluates your needs, gives you $10 and spends the rest on other stuff. I now have $60 and you have $20. Now let's suppose that we replace this with a linear tax which is simpler, but nominally even higher: the government takes (50%-$20) from everybody, so it takes $50 from me and $5 from you over the year, and gives each of us $20 in weekly payments. I end up with $70, you with $25. Okay, has the government expanded or shrunk? It collected $55 where before it collected only $40, and borrowed nothing in either case, so obviously it's "bigger" -- or is it? Or is this the wrong question? I'd choose a linear tax at the Federal level (no deductions at all, except that your 401(K) can hold any investment paper you like including your bank account, so money is taxed only as you spend it), and I'd watch state/local experiments with more complicated schemes, but I don't believe "spending/GDP" would measure the result in an interesting way. No, this is not congenial.

Greenspun goes on:

What about Keynes? Japan is a good example of the failure of Keynesian economics in the globalized era. The country spent hugely on public works projects in the 1990s,...
Well, yeah. As Sumner has written over and over again (and as Bernanke wrote years ago), Japan's central bankers have repeatedly chosen a monetary policy calculated to prevent growth no matter what fiscal policy was adopted. Very odd, but Greenspun isn't making a suggestion so much as countering a fiscal-policy suggestion -- yet he never brings monetary policy into it, which I find even odder.

Now we get into strange territory:

Investor Representation on Public Company Boards Right now the shareholders of a public company are at the mercy of management. ...
I don't get this one at all. If management salaries and bonuses are "looting" companies, then investors should do better by choosing the least-looted companies; we are perfectly free to vote with our feet. I think that my simplified no-deductions tax scheme would reduce the value of superstar friends-of-Bill-or-George-or-Barack managers, I see crony capitalism and regulatory revolving doors as significant problems for democracy as well as startup businesses, but I don't see where Greenspun is coming from here.

Depreciation of Capital Expenses...
Oh, please. I believe this to be another non-problem: if a cash-flow-negative company has good earnings prospects it can borrow the money for its first few years. This is routine. If it doesn't, then flexible depreciation won't help.

Education... Our country's best performing schools (all of them private) have non-unionized teaching staffs. We can't afford to experiment with unionized teachers anymore...
Ummmm, well, absotively posilutely maybe. Or not. I could see a federal role for educational infrastructure, mostly in the form of teaching/testing material (especially educational computer games) to be freely used by anyone who likes it. I would like to introduce competition for every school...I would like lots of stuff. My impression of the overall generational impact of the teachers' unions is extremely negative, but I would put this way down on any list of stuff I'd like.

Transportation System Reform... Public transit unions should be eliminated because ...
I think I see a theme here. Greenspun doesn't like unions. Well, I dunno as how I like what they've gradually grown into all that much myself, but if Greenspun thinks that businesses don't invest in NYC because they're afraid that public transit stoppages will keep workers from getting to work, I think he's going just a teensy bit over the top. The main transportation reform we need is for transportation of bits so telecommuting works better than it does. (This will greatly relieve NYC traffic congestion, but congestion charges should be applied also: my E-ZPass should be charged a few cents, about once a block, whenever I drive in NYC -- rather than just once on the GW Bridge as I head to the city and Icon Parking. And E-ZPass should be required for driving in the city. Period. But the Feds should have nothing to do with it, and it has little to do with averting a recession, so it doesn't belong here.)

Predictable Product Liability System We need a fixed range of prices for people killed or injured by products...
Wow. Well, I guess we're working on Exodus 21 KJV
28 If an ox gore a man or a woman, that they die: then the ox shall be surely stoned, and his flesh shall not be eaten; but the owner of the ox shall be quit. 29 But if the ox were wont to push with his horn in time past, and it hath been testified to his owner, and he hath not kept him in, but that he hath killed a man or a woman; the ox shall be stoned, and his owner also shall be put to death. 30 If there be laid on him a sum of money, then he shall give for the ransom of his life whatsoever is laid upon him. 31 Whether he have gored a son, or have gored a daughter, according to this judgment shall it be done unto him. 32 If the ox shall push a manservant or a maidservant; he shall give unto their master thirty shekels of silver, and the ox shall be stoned.
Wow. I guess I sympathize with Greenspun, and with those who disagree with him. Hmm... It doesn't belong here. What else?

Labor Market Deregulation We may soon have deflation. Workers who are young or with poor skills need entry-level jobs in order to build skills and experience. They won't be able to get them if the minimum wage is set higher than the market-clearing wage. ...
Well, here again I think I'm seeing a tendency to look at the current (2008) emergency and see one's prior preferences as solutions to whatever's wrong. Yeah, I think that some entry-level unemployment, along with the increasing use of gadgetry in your neighborhood McDonald's and Burger King, are driven by the minimum wage. And I'd like to get rid of it, as one of the items that gets replaced by the weekly payments of my linear tax scheme above. But I'm averse to pushing it into a "minimum steps" for Depression-aversion.

Substitute Web-based Education and Trade for Foreign Aid We don't spend a large percentage of GDP on foreign aid, but the perception is that the absolute amount is large and nearly all of it is wasted or siphoned off by Third World officials. ...Let's start with a simple message that business investors can embrace: "We've eliminated all U.S. foreign aid spending."
That's interesting, and again I can mostly support his substitution (especially the end to farm subsidies) as better support for developing-country economies. But I simply wouldn't put it in this list at all.

Immigration Policy ...With our crushing overhang of government debt, entitlement programs, and public-employee pensions, the only question we can afford to ask about an immigrant is "How much in taxes will this person pay and for how long?" Countries such as New Zealand apply a point system.
Well, that's interesting. And I do think that our excess housing inventory could have been fixed, reducing the minor recession that we would have gotten even if the Fed had chosen NGDP level targeting from (at least) early 2008 onwards, by admitting a whole bunch of people on a points system. And our current immigration system is so awful that any rational basis would be better than what we've got. But It Doesn't Belong On This List.

Now, my short-range recovery plan, for whatever it may be worth, would be Sumnerian -- it would have to do with my acceptance of Sumner's view of the immediate causes of the recession. Note again that Greenspun was writing in November 2008. As Sumner says,

1. The NGDP and RGDP collapse ... occurred almost entirely between June and December 2008. I argue that NGDP targeting could have prevented that collapse..... the financial crisis of September 2008 did not cause a stock market crash, as the markets expected the Fed to continue its multi-decade policy of keeping NGDP growing at about 5% a year. If the markets had given up on the Fed in September 2008, they wouldn’t have waited until October to crash. 6. I argue that stocks crashed 23% in early October on little financial news. Instead, there were ominous reports of rapidly falling orders all over the industrial world. Markets then sniffed out Fed passivity, a failure of the Fed to do what it takes to maintain the Great Moderation. They became demoralized. 7. I argue that the only significant Fed policy during the October crash was the [contractionary] IOR program,
The recession's unemployment has gradually become more structural, but I believe more monetary response would still help a lot. Indeed, I believe QE2 did help a bunch.

Whatever. Yeah, I'm Greenspunish in some ways. Okay, I'd really like "Market Deregulation" on a really large scale -- in fact I'd like to move away from regulatory government to required-insurance government. Hm... that's not a Greenspun concept. Overall, I don't find Greenspun all that congenial. Interesting, and he's dissatisfied with many of the same things I am, but not congenial. There's an overlap between his thinking then and my thinking now, but then I overlap quite a bit with almost everybody.

Except, of course, for me. I hardly overlap with me at all, and since whichever of us is right I'm certainly wrong, these thoughts belong on this blog.

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Monday, December 20, 2010

NGDP Level Targets; Incentives and Feedback

As I said awhile back, I think The Fed Did It.

Think of a zillion spreadsheets carrying business plans and personal plans forward a few years, each projecting current trends. Aggregate cash flow -- that's "Nominal GDP". NGDP. Money. Some of those spreadsheets, some of those plans, will fail and others do better than expected, but generally the aggregate cash flow rises each year as population goes up, as productivity goes up, and as inflation goes on. If it falls or rises a little away from the expected trend implicit in all those individual plans, we adapt. If it falls sharply below trend, then cash isn't going around as expected and plans start failing simply because cash isn't going around: businesses fail and it's not their fault. Things are broken. We have a recession, a bad one. In fact, people act by plans and promises, betting on their projections, so we get a recession as soon as the expected NGDP growth fails so that people stop buying and employers stop hiring.
That's my version of the Scott Sumner explanation of the recession. So...

I'm looking at the monetary policy argument between Sumner, DeLong, and now Woolsey, pointing out at least one DeLong error, which DeLong summarizes at DeLong Smackdown Watch: Nominal GDP Targeting Via Index Futures - Grasping Reality with a Shiny Red Nose: Merry Christmas, Everyone!

Right now, in December 2010, we want to give people an incentive to take actions that expand the money supply if they think that nominal GDP at the end of 2011 is likely to be lower than $17.5 trillion and to contract the money supply if they think that nominal GDP at the end of 2011 is likely to be higher than $17.5 trillion.... Touche...I think....

I think I follow most of it, perhaps all of it -- well, not all of it, but I'm not sure that my confusion is a result of not following. I'm still confused about incentives and feedback in the proposed market.

Woolsey's idea, which Sumner defers to, is that the Fed would offer dollar contracts, in effect loans at an interest rate depending on future NGDP; these would be hedged, in fact Woolsey says that

the Fed's goal should be to remain fully hedged. The market expection should be that NGDP remain on target. The long positions of the bulls should be exactly offset by the short positions of the bears. If the market expectation is that NGDP will be above target, then the purchases of the bulls will be greater than the sales of the bears...
and the Fed can use this as a guide to bring NGDP growth back on target.

In other words, the Fed will say "we will define the NGDP growth path, and if you bet against us expecting us to fail then we will use that as a guide to get back on track and thus make sure that you don't make any money." This strikes me as an inadequate incentive. If the bulls/bears bet, then they will provide the feedback by which they don't make money; if they don't bet, there will be no feedback and they could make money by betting. Bulls and bears alike are being asked to make self-negating prophecies. My thoughts turn to Curry's Y combinator and the standard "paradox",

Y not = not(Y not)
but that's probably just me.

I really don't see how this will work; if I'm right (unlikely), then we do need a secondary market to provide the guidance, a "derivatives" market of a sort, a prediction market: we need to let people bet instead on their self-fulfilling prophecies of how much expansion/contraction the Fed will have applied, on net, in their efforts to get to the NGDP target level. My preference is still, as I've said, to use some version of the Wilshire Index, to have the Fed use some version of a daily-rebalancing stock/bonds/money portfolio as a primary tool of monetary policy, to help with what DeLong calls "a Minskyite downturn--a flight to quality because of a collapse in the market's risk tolerance and a shortage of safe assets." The bears can make money if the Fed has to raise its stocks+bonds percentages in trying to reach the desired NGDP, and the bulls can make money if it has to lower them; if bears outweigh bulls or vice-versa, then that portfolio percentage will adjust. (It may adjust anyway if the Fed board actually believes they won't otherwise make target; unlike Sumner and Woolsey, I'm not really confident of an autopilot solution. But of course autopilot would be better if we could be sure it would work.)

Or then again, maybe not.

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Wednesday, September 29, 2010

Yeah, the Fed Did It.

(More precisely, the Fed aggravated it; the Fed could have prevented most of it; the extent to which we depend on the Fed's good judgment should shrink, not grow.)

I believe we've been having a three-component economic crisis, each component building on and worse than the one before it, with overambitious or overconfident regulators/legislators making each component far worse than it needed to be. The three components I see are

  • the trend-following housing (and financial services) bubble, which the Fed worsened slightly by false reassurances;
  • the security-seeking, trend-breaking cash crunch which the Fed worsened greatly by too-tight monetary policy;
  • the longer-run tech-based employment recalculation. (All right, the Fed is not guilty here but it mostly hasn't happened yet, and our sensitivity to the mistakes the Fed made this time is growing with time. Cheer up, the worst is yet to come.)

bubble: I've commented on the housing bubble before, and how I think it was worsened by regulators and legislators (and raters) who denied the problem. Investor irrationality was real, but part of that irrationality was the willingness of investors to trust pronouncements by Greenspan and Bernanke, by Barney Frank and others on both sides of the aisle, and of course their willingness to believe that AAA meant "safe". I'm not arguing that interest rates were or weren't too low. (I do not believe that was the problem.) I'm not saying that the regulators were (or are, or will be) stupid or malevolent. I am saying that they were, quite obviously, wrong, and that those who relied on their assurances did very badly. (Those who simply said "prices are rising, I'll bet everything I can borrow that the trend will continue" did exactly as badly; there are always some of those.) I'd fix that (following Arnold Kling) mainly by going back to a world of high down payments. You could still give 100% financing if you wanted, but any federal support (including FDIC guarantees for a bank that offers mortgages) should depend on at least 20% down payment. Leverage would shrink generally, and underwater mortgages would be extremely rare. This would reduce homeownership rates, of course, and that may be regrettable, but it's not obvious that people are helped by encouraging them to make commitments they are likely to break, or be broken by. Of course this version of Kling's reform won't happen; what we're getting instead is expanded trust in that which failed before, to which we add taxpayers having to guarantee more than 95% of mortages, still being pushed on those who can't afford them.

cash crunch: As I've said before, I've become a semi-Sumnerite:

the real problem right now is not a “real” problem. The real problem is a nominal problem. When the growth rate of nominal GDP falls sharply there is always a severe recession. We have a severe nominal shock, a problem which has been understood by economists at least as far back as Hume. At the time, it always looks like the “real problem” was some symptom of the monetary shock, such as financial panic. Thus in the 1930s people thought the collapsing financial system caused the Great Depression, only later did we discover it was too little money.
Investors' efforts to minimize individual risk ended up adding to systemic risk. Actually it seems to me that we knew by February 2008, when Roubini said,
"Cash is king in 2008,"... the U.S. went into recession in December and will stay there for at least a year.
The Federal Reserve under Bernanke ignored what Bernanke had written academically; it brought down interest rates and then declared a "liquidity trap". It did expand the monetary base, but not nearly enough to satisfy demand -- and they neutralized part of their monetary expansion in fall 2008, by paying interest on excess reserves, encouraging hoarding by banks. Cash remained king, mostly because people were worried about too much risk in their portfolios. Here I would agree with Sumner that we should target NGDP (nominal GDP, aggregate cash flow) but I worry that buying Treasury bonds with cash, exchanging one low-risk item for another, might not succeed; we need to cope with people trying to shed risk. The Fed's purchases of mortgage-backed securities seems like a really bad idea: this is not absorbing risk in the sense of variability, it's buying a bet that already failed and attempting to prop up a market that should go downwards because there are too many houses out there for a while. So,
  • I'd make NGDP measures tradable in the form of Shiller's trills, creating a permanent market growing to perhaps a billion trills, paying one-tenth of one percent of our GDP, owned by citizens or foreigners but not by our own government.
  • Like Sumner, I would announce that we're targeting a 5% growth trend in trill yield (i.e., in NGDP), based on the pre-2008 trend so that if it rises too fast or too slow in one year we compensate the next; this is "level targeting".
  • I would give the Fed a stock-bonds-cash portfolio to be rebalanced daily, where the cash can be effectively imaginary (set it at last year's NGDP, most will never be printed) and all stocks are treated equally via a Wilshire Index fund; this rebalancing portfolio is the key difference between me and everybody else, hence probably totally wrong, but it makes sense to me. If investors starts selling stocks, the Fed will automatically buy, or sell if everyone else is buying, so this couple-of-trillion portfolio would automatically tend to stabilize the market. It would probably make money for taxpayers, too.
  • How would it stabilize the NGDP trend? When trills (next year's trills; buy them now!) start to fall, the Fed would change the portfolio proportions, giving cash for stocks and perhaps bonds, absorbing risk and satisfying the demand for cash. When trills start to rise above the price level target, the Fed portfolio proportions would change back.
  • Actually, I might make this last item more indirect: I might start a prediction market on the proportions required to achieve the actual NGDP target. In effect, I'd be giving knowledgeable parties something to bet on, so that they'd make money by getting it right. I don't want them able to make money by betting on the actual cash value of a trill's annual yield: that's (2008 yield)*(1.05^N), so the "right answer" is known in advance. Bet on the unknown path to that, instead. The Fed would use this prediction market to guide the proportions.
Instead of this, of course, we're giving the Fed a more complex mission as if its people had enhanced credibility. Since their credibility with me has gone way down, I don't find this reassuring.

employment recalculation: Kling talks about recalculation, reallocation of resources including labor in the constant search for "sustainable patterns of specialization and trade", and the unemployment this causes. Sumner acknowledges that some recalculation was required at the beginning, but mostly he just means the structural issues of too big a housing sector (and finance.) Delong and Krugman point to aggregate-demand-based unemployment and say that structural unemployment is on the way, but not yet a big deal. (Of course current unemployment is made worse by underwater mortgages which keep people from moving where the jobs are, and therefore by low-down-payment policies. And it's made directly worse by the cash crunch which motivates companies to sit on their cash, and it's made worse by regulatory uncertainty (and especially health care) and inflation uncertainty. But this is talking about aggregate demand v. structural, with recalculation as part of a slightly different story.)

I'd agree with them all, mostly, but add that recalculation is growing as an issue in a way they haven't (to my knowledge) discussed. My feeling is that overall technological productivity will gradually become the biggest factor in continuing unemployment, in the sensitivity of unemployment rates to (failures in) NGDP trends. I think that our increasing wealth and productivity means that a sharply decreasing fraction of the population is generating stuff we actually need, and a less-sharply decreasing fraction of the population is generating stuff we think we need. When money-trends continue, this doesn't matter because people buy whatever they were planning to buy. When money-trends fail and people want to hide their money, only the essentials keep going and that's a shrinking part of the economy. In the long run, (almost?) all production of goods and services is optional. In the short-to-medium run it would be enough to have the Fed do its job, making sure money-trends continue so people are comfortable buying stuff they want, not just what they think they need. In the long run, we will also need a negative income tax.

My approach to this stuff would be even more drastic, and therefore more unlikely, than my approaches to the preceding problems. So I won't finish this part of this post.

Footnote, since this is stuff that wasn't part of the way I thought through 2008: Aggregate cash flow is NGDP, Nominal Gross Domestic Product, the sum of all the money we pay (or get paid) for all the goods and services we use (and produce). You can divide that by your best guess at an inflation multiplier to get "Real GDP", the theoretical "constant-dollar" value of all those goods and services, but your paycheck and mortgage payment and grocery bill are paid in actual nominal cash flowing around and around, keeping our individual financial plans going by fulfilling the promises that we need to make economics ("sustainable patterns of specialization and trade", as per Arnold Kling) work. If expected NGDP drops, then you're already in a recession. I didn't really follow this argument when Tyler Cowen first recommended Sumner's blog. In the end, it's not that complicated. Think of a zillion spreadsheets carrying business plans and personal plans forward a few years, each projecting current trends. Aggregate cash flow -- that's "Nominal GDP". NGDP. Money. Some of those spreadsheets, some of those plans, will fail and others do better than expected, but generally the aggregate cash flow rises each year as population goes up, as productivity goes up, and as inflation goes on. If it falls or rises a little away from the expected trend implicit in all those individual plans, we adapt. If it falls sharply below trend, then cash isn't going around as expected and plans start failing simply because cash isn't going around: businesses fail and it's not their fault. Things are broken. We have a recession, a bad one.

In fact, people act by plans and promises, betting on their projections, so we get a recession as soon as the expected NGDP growth fails so that people stop buying and employers stop hiring.

Q: That sort of sounds almost convincing. Very odd. But isn't the future causing the present here?

A: Gee, thank you. It's actually close to tautological: expected NGDP is the aggregate of expected cash flow, and your belief that you're no longer going to be able to buy the goods and services you expected to buy will immediately change your behavior, the recession hits as soon as you expect it. So it's your beliefs about the future causing your behavior in the present.

In the current case we had a small recession because a whole lot of investors had believed our regulators and legislators who downplayed the risks of the bubble. They -- the investors -- had believed in the AAA ratings. When they hit reality they bounced, and needed more cash.

Q: But is this the Fed's fault? I mean, apart from Greenspan and then Bernanke denying the bubble?

A: The Fed has a dual mandate: they are supposed to manage inflation and unemployment, by managing the money supply. I'm saying that I mostly believe Sumner: the Fed did expand money somewhat, but they could have avoided most of the pain we've felt if they'd done more. So yeah, it's their fault.

Q: Done more? Done what? Lowered interest rates below zero?

A: Well, first by not paying interest on (excess) reserves, which was and is contractionary. Second, by announcing an inflation target or better an NGDP level-targeting sequence. Third, by expanding their open market purchases; preferably by starting the kind of automatically daily-rebalancing portfolio I described above.

Q: I understand why paying interest on reserves is contractionary; why are they doing it?

A: I don't really understand, but I think it's simply a way to give the banks money so they don't fail, while pretending that it's not Main Street bailing out Wall Street. I'm getting very cynical in my old age.

Ryan Avent of the Economist said

It's getting ever more difficult to avoid concluding that the Fed's inflation target is not the 2% we'd all come to expect, but something much closer to zero. This obviously impacts economic behaviour. The Fed could potentially have a significant effect on conditions simply by letting markets know that it's not actually happy with the current inflation trajectory.
Recently (Sept 2010) Bernanke has said that, with good effect; let's hope he goes further. There's some evidence that it will happen, e.g. Calculated Risk's Fed's Lockhart: The Approaching Monetary Policy Decision Dilemma
I think a consensus is building for QE2 in early November.
But I don't trust Bernanke to follow through, or at least I don't trust the Fed he leads...and that's what it depends on.

Or then again (I hope), maybe not.

Update: I see Avent saying in The perils of prediction: Forget forecasts, trust markets | The Economist that

I like to point out that in June of 2008 the Federal Reserve forecast real GDP growth in 2009 of 2.0% to 2.8%, when in fact the economy shrank in 2009 by over 2%. Of course, this doesn't mean that central banks have no basis on which to make policy. All they need do is look at the evidence in front of them. Markets...
I trust markets a lot more than I trust the Fed.

Perhaps I should note that Sumner does not blame the Fed for failure to predict, as he said in TheMoneyIllusion » The Fed doesn’t have a crystal ball

All the major investment banks with their million dollar Ivy League employees missed this crisis (and its eventual impact), and yet the Fed was supposed to have predicted it? The Fed pays much lower salaries than Wall Street.
Indeed, I wouldn't blame the Fed for the housing bubble recession-trigger at all if Greenspan (and then Bernanke) had simply said "Bubble-detection is not part of my job, I can't help you with that." But this is not what I understood them to be saying.

update: Ah-ha! An actual reputable economist, Nick Rowe, says at least that

If I had my druthers, the Fed would buy stocks. Something like the S&P500 index.
This is not equivalent to saying that the Fed should do a large part of its monetary policy via a rebalancing portfolio somewhat similar to what investment people prescribe for individuals, but it's a start. Yay!

(Or then again, maybe not.)

upd: The same Nick Rowe is quoted approvingly by Brad Delong in Against Money-Financed Fiscal Expansion, For Open Market Operations in Equity Indexes

OK. Start with the Fed buying bridges. That will work. Now, wouldn't it be nice if the Fed could also sell those bridges again later, if it needs to, as it probably will. Bridges aren't very liquid. And, the Fed is good at clipping coupons on bonds, but perhaps not very experienced at collecting tolls on bridges. Hmmm. Maybe if the Fed just bought shares in bridges instead, that would be as good as bridges, but even better from the practical point of view. Hmmm. Why stop at bridges? Why not buy shares in everything? Why not just buy the Wilshire 5000, or some such index?
Excellent. The right index identified, along with the need for later sale; we are close to portfolio rebalancing.

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Thursday, January 28, 2010

Painting the Future

A paint-focussed sister, indeed a sister who long ago handed her ten-year-old brother (or was I eleven? or am I misremembering altogether?) a copy of Clarke's Tales from the White Hart, adds a comment to my paint-focussed previous post:

When we were children we devoured science fiction. Among the many books or stories that we read there was one about one's social obligation to use things, so that people could go on making things. I suppose that the painters who are displaced by robots could find meaningful employ assembling robots but I suspect that in your world the robots are self replicating.¿Que no?

Indeed there were some like that; I'm vaguely remembering a guy who is born to a middle-class family meaning that he has to consume rather heavily, but invents or adapts robots to do the consumption which is a crime until he shows that the adaptation involves getting the robots to enjoy consumption in a controllable way, so he gets to be a hero and live in a sparsely-furnished apartment...something like that. I took this as ironic let's-invert-everything rather than serious world-building; Clarke himself commented somewhere that in a wealthy world (long before "post-Singularitarian" was a phrase) people would do art, science, literature, mathematics... I think he left out sports. I really don't think there's a problem here: for a couple of centuries we have developed an ethos of job-identity, which has been key to making the Industrial Revolution work, but humans of a few hundred centuries back had nothing of the kind and I don't believe humans of a century hence will either. We'll have better things to do.

Of course, we're not nearly smart enough to appreciate most of the math and science that have yet to be invented, or even much of what has been, but we can take care of that. As Charlie Kam's fairly famous song, I Am The Very Model of a Singularitarian, puts it (about 50 seconds in), we'll expand our mental faculties by merging with technology. Consider a few of the links here.

Or just think about the past, when we first encountered the future, in the school of, well, José Azueta:

José Azueta, hero of the act of April 21, 1914 in the Port of Veracruz, who, together with a handful of men from the town and students of the Heroic Military Naval Academy, defended the national dignity and sovereignty with his blood, was the son of Commodore Manuel Azueta Perillos and Josefa Abad. He was born in the Port of Acapulco, Gro. on May 2, 1895. When his father was sent to the port of Veracruz due to the service, the family established its residence in that site of the gulf. José studied his elementary instruction in the Municipal School of Veracruz, José Miguel Macías, where he had a very good behavior, a distinguished performance and a notorious learning in all his courses.
He had a notorious learning in all his courses. I tried (and I remember being rather unhappy when Dad explained that the Mexican-War history I was getting in Mexican public school was probably less slanted than the version in Calvert Correspondence school), but I don't think I managed notorious learning in Mexican elementary school. Maybe you did.

The past was very interesting, but if we can survive a reasonable ways into the future, I expect to like it better.

Or then again, maybe not.

Update: perhaps I should have mentioned that I recently got your elder niece to read Tales from the White Hart -- as a neuroscience graduate student, she ought to be familiar with his 1950's insights into what she's trying to do now. And just a moment ago, your younger niece went off to the orthodontist (missing school for the appointment) and I noticed that she was taking a copy of The Collected Stories of Arthur C. Clarke.

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Saturday, January 23, 2010

Blowing Bubbles: everybody's wrong except me

Back in September I posted some of my Bubble Thoughts about the housing bubble pop which I had anticipated and the "resulting" crash which I had not, saying

Personally, I did see the bubble as such, earlier than some...I sent a message titled "Housing bubble warning" on June 5, 2003. Was I prescient? No, I was just quoting the Economist of that time...
I didn't mention (last September) that I'd become a semi-Sumnerite, a believer in much of the theorizing of Scott Sumner at The Money Illusion, who claims that
even a major misallocation of resources such as the housing boom of 2003-06 does not cause a big enough misallocation to create a recession. That’s why the initial downturn in housing was handled well, with only a minor bump in unemployment between mid-2006 and mid-2008. The big jump in unemployment more recently was caused by a sharp fall in NGDP, i.e. tight money.

I've come to believe him about that, to a large extent, so I owe both of them an intellectual debt of sorts. But today I think they're both wrong...well, also they're both right, and I think they both exaggerate the real differences between them. Sumner is saying in reference to the same article (I think) that I quoted,

Back in May 2003 The Economist said that many countries were in the midst of a housing bubble:
and that
in all 6 countries their predictions were wildly inaccurate for the 4 year time window they specified.
He really doesn't believe in bubbles. Or does he? As quoted above, he does believe in "a major misallocation of resources such as the housing boom." The Economist rebuts that they were giving "Good housing market advice", and that
the story The Economist was telling about what was happening was fundamentally correct

My current view is that the Economist was and is praiseworthily right to call "bubble", but the Economist of 2003 was mildly blameworthy in making the specific predictions it made (I didn't even take these seriously, remembering how "irrational exuberance" had gone on for years) and is mildly blameworthy now to evade the flat admission that anybody who believed those specific predictions and invested accordingly would have lost money. The 2010 Economist sounds like an astrologer or psychic claiming credit for being almost right, which is another way of saying wrong. But that doesn't mean bubbles don't exist; it just means that when markets are irrational it's really hard to outguess them (The market can stay irrational longer than you can stay solvent.) I mostly like Bill Woolsey's response:

I believe bubbles exist. Vernon Smith's experiments provide enough evidence for me. The basic problem is "momentum" traders. They buy into a rising market and sell into a falling market. They have naive expectations, projecting past price changes into the future.

Like Woolsey, I do think bubbles are real, like the Economist I think bubble-probability is worth thinking about from an investment standpoint.

I think Sumner could respond (and maybe has responded) that if you can detect this, then you're free to make money from it -- but I don't think that's an adequate response. I didn't and don't know any good way to bet that "I think this asset is priced above trend" apart from staying away from it: selling short doesn't work unless you have a time-frame in mind. I didn't believe the Economist's specific predictions, but I do think the Economist helped me (and my son) avoid losing money. We avoided investing in stuff which the Economist (and then Shiller) had suggested was risky. Shiller does better, trying to invent financial instruments which I've interpreted as ways in which to make money from such information, so that the markets will in fact become more efficient. But they're far from perfect, and always will be.

Or maybe not?

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Monday, September 14, 2009

Bubble Thoughts

I haven't posted for a long time, but it's not that I haven't made any mistakes. Indeed, I've participated to some extent in one of the biggest mistakes of my lifetime -- the market crash of 2008.

Personally, I did see the bubble as such, earlier than some...I sent a message titled "Housing bubble warning" on June 5, 2003. Was I prescient? No, I was just quoting the Economist of that time:

 http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=1794873

 This survey will conclude that the latest housing boom has inflated
 bubbles in several countries, notably America, Australia, Britain,
 Ireland, the Netherlands and Spain. Within the next year or so those
 bubbles are likely to burst, .... ... ... Significant numbers of
 owners may be left with homes worth less than their mortgages...  

After the quote, I closed that message saying
 And of course if houses are worth less than their mortgages, there
 might be bunches of trouble of various kinds. "Within the next year or so".

 Tom of-course,with-stocks-irrational-exuberance-kept-going-for-years Myers 
And I went on talking about it for the next few years, as I had talked about the original "irrational exuberance" starting around 1997, and I sold some real estate and urged people to read Shiller's second edition when it came out, and urged my son not to buy real estate (and he didn't), but I didn't foresee the crash. I didn't realize that the global financial system was betting trillions that Shiller was wrong.

It doesn't worry me that I didn't foresee the timing of the pop; I never expected to be able to do so, so I did not even think about betting against the market myself. ("The market can remain irrational longer than you can remain solvent.") It does bother me that neither I nor the experts foresaw the disaster it has become. If you'd told me in 2006 that we'd be having a banking crisis, I'd have said something like

"of course we have a real estate bubble, and when it pops we'll have a wealth-effect problem, perhaps a small recession, but people who run banks or investment firms know what Shiller has been saying and they know they've got to hedge against his being right, even if they don't believe him. I read a bunch of economists' blogs; they talk about the housing bubble, they're not talking about a crash."

In other words, I depended upon experts. There were some who kept on predicting one disaster or another, most notably Paul Krugman and Nouriel Roubini. They seem to have gained credibility from the meltdown and recession, but they both predicted a dramatic fall in the dollar as part of the meltdown they predicted. Krugman, it seems, has been predicting a dramatic fall in the dollar since the mid-1980s. Understandable, of course, but that doesn't count heavily as a prediction. As to Roubini, it doesn't really bother me that he "was one of those who predicted 10 crises out of three", but it does bother me that, like Krugman, "In 2004, he predicted that the oncoming recession would precipitate the crash of the dollar. The crisis has mainly buoyed it."

Of course the dollar still might fall -- it seems to me I put something about that in class notes (computer science, looking around for random examples of numerical stuff to model) of the late 1980s, and I may have been reading Krugman back then. For me it went along with a comparison of the savings rates of Americans vs. Japanese, as now it would go along with thoughts about our suddenly increased Federal debt, with the prospect of continuing increases. But the dollar didn't fall as part of the crash we're talking about, so the crash we're talking about is not the one Krugman and Roubini predicted. Or so it seems to me.

To a disturbing extent, I think expertise in (macro)economics has been discredited. I don't believe this is adequately answered by Greg Mankiw's

It is fair to say that this crisis caught most economists flat-footed.
In the eyes of some people, this forecasting failure is an indictment
of the profession.

But that is the wrong interpretation. In one way, the current downturn
is typical: Most economic slumps take us by surprise. Fluctuations
in economic activity are largely unpredictable....

Likewise, students should understand that a good course in economics
will not equip them with a crystal ball. Instead, it will allow them
to assess the risks and to be ready for surprises. 
Yes, but macroeconomists did not assess the risks, at least not correctly, and were not ready for surprises. We were all clueless. The academics, the legislators, the regulators, the raters, the financial moguls, investment advisors, ordinary investors... clueless. That's not good. So, do I have a theory? Sure. Lots of overlapping theories, and I think that each of them is probably somewhat true. More later.

Or then again, maybe not.

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