Thoughts on Greece, and us

A large part of what holds Greece back, and us as well, is fairly described as rent-seeking--manipulation of public power for private profit, one way or another. In Greece, as in the Latin America of my childhood, it's much more likely to take the form of simple corruption: imagine (as I was told in Greece last week) an underpaid government official who approves environmental permits, and who provides faster service for those who provide extra money. And then he slows down the uncompensated permits sharply, to encourage the trade. It's not that he is lazy or works few hours, it's not even that there are too many such officials -- all that is often said but seems to be wrong. It's simply that his work product tends to detract from actual GDP, even as it's added at "cost" to official GDP. If he weren't doing that, Greece would be richer.

Other kinds of rent-seekers include those who profit from government-imposed monopolies, like the Athens taxi-drivers now striking, unpredictably blocking port and airport. Rent-seeking is a pretty broad category in my mind. I suppose that all countries end up with issues of regulatory capture and indeed of crony capitalism; government makes rules, and these rules will tend to promote the interests of those who have something to offer to the rule-makers, or some credible threat they can make. That interest-promotion is "rent," paid to the people who've managed to make some government power into their own property, legally or not.

I spent last week on Spetses, with various extended-family events relating to my granddaughter's baptism. It's interesting and educational to listen to Greeks and Greek-Americans talking about their fiscal crisis; I'd hoped to get some time specifically listening to Yannis Ioannides and Anna Hardman, and did, but not enough for real understanding. Yannis' basic Greece-is-not-bankrupt statement surprised me considerably (see Ioannides Says Greece Not Bankrupt, Must Change Economy: Video - Bloomberg). He thinks Greece really can pay its debts -- and he thought that even before the ’Restricted Default’ deal of this week, so I presume he thinks his case has been strengthened. He's an advocate for the austerity measures, which I suppose makes him one of the Serious People of whom Paul Krugman said this week in 1937! 1937! 1937! - NYTimes.com that

OK, so we’re going to demand harsh austerity in the debt-crisis countries; and meanwhile, we’re also going to have austerity in the non-debt-crisis countries. Plus, the ECB is raising rates. So demand will be depressed in both crisis and non-crisis economies; this will lead to a vigorous recovery through … what? The Serious People are determined to destroy all the advanced economies in the name of prudence.

I'm mostly on Krugman's side there; we're combining monetary policy from the ECB which may be reasonable for Germany but not for Greece, along with drastic contractions of an uncomfortably the-beatings-will-continue-until-morale-improves flavor. Or so it seems to me. But Yannis isn't supporting austerity to reassure bond markets as Krugman says; Yannis thinks that the "austerity" (including the deregulation of taxi medallions being protested) is part of breaking or at least limiting the rent-seeking system. Well, I'm not sure he or Anna ever said "rent-seeking" but that's my understanding of what they did say, and when I look for related material online I find things like BusinessInsider's querying a member of the `professional "elite" class' of Greece, who said

We want the Greek economy reformed. An end to the of unimaginable waste of taxpayers money,...cronyism and corruption. A much smaller and reformed public sector... A pursuit and prosecution of presently wide spread tax evasion practices. The above would immediately provide us with a considerable primary surplus, enabling us to keep repaying our debt, an obligation we wish to honour. ... Unfortunately it appears that the average Greek, does not view things the same way.

That certainly sounds like the viewpoint of the Greeks with whom I spoke. And how big is the corruption problem? Well, Transparency International said

The Greeks paid an average of €1,355 ($1,830) in bribes [in 2009] for public services such as speeding up the issue of driver's licenses and construction permits, getting admitted to public hospitals or manipulating tax returns, ... Bribes paid for private sector services such as lawyers, doctors or banks were even higher...

So really, Yannis and those he supports (to the extent that I understand what's going on here) are not so much engaged in economics as in political action aimed at restructuring Greek culture. Otherwise, the bailouts fail. In The Painful Arithmetic of Greek Debt Default | e21 - Economic Policies for the 21st Century I see

How does corruption limit the capacity for tax and spending reform? Tax avoidance, which relies on bribery to avoid prosecution, is a national pastime in Greece – the envelope used in the bribe even has its own name, the “fakelaki,” confirming the age-old adage that the Greeks “have a word for it.” Bribery is so rampant in Greece that real estate developers’ method of obtaining cheap land is to burn down public land, squat on the burned parcels, and pay off public officials to permit this. Greece’s forest fires, particularly in the Peloponnese in 2007, have been a source of public outrage for years, and yet the developers continue to squat on the land with impunity. Is a society that permits that sort of lawlessness capable of tax reform?

Maybe. Maybe not. I respect Yannis, but if the average Greek doesn't believe in it to begin with, I don't see a happy ending to this story.

Corruption is by no means the only problem, and an end to rent-seeking would not necessarily make Greece fit comfortably into the Eurozone. Clearly, little Greece will never be the target of the ECB's monetary policy. Krugman, in Anatomy of a Euromess, said that

Spain’s troubles are not, despite what you may have read, the result of fiscal irresponsibility. Instead, they reflect “asymmetric shocks” within the eurozone, which were always known to be a problem, but have turned out to be an even worse problem than the euroskeptics feared.

David Beckworth took Krugman's analysis and extended it in "Optimal Currency Area" terms within Eurozone Periphery and the Euro, saying

If a region’s economy is not in sync with the currency union’s business cycle and the above listed shock absorbers ("flexible wages and prices, factor mobility, fiscal transfers, and diversified economies") are absent then it does not makes sense for a country to be a part of the currency union. Instead, the country should keep its own currency which itself will act as a shock absorber.

It's no great surprise to see that in his graphs, Greece ends up as the most ill-placed. But I believe that part of the "austerity" program is intended to increase the flexibility of the job market (by pruning job protection programs, as has been tried before) and maybe, if the austerity programs are accepted, maybe things will work out. For a while. Public Pensions and Labor Force Participation: The Case of Greece

The pension system of Greece is a representative case of the “Mediterranean welfare state”, which is characterized by extensive segmentation, very high payroll tax rates, and yet inadequate pension benefits. In order to explain this paradox we construct an economic–demographic model. We show that in the period 1980–2000, the segmentation of the system and the very low labor force participation rates of the Greek economy have resulted in very high payroll tax rates in relation to the current level of benefits. On top of these problems, the expected adverse demographic developments in the period 2005–2050 will render the pension system completely unsustainable.

Still, the near-term need is to cut the rent-seeking (including corruption) and collect the taxes and shrink the regulatory/welfare state. Maybe. And can it be done? Well, my own approach in Greece, even more than in the US would be:

automate, eliminate, simplify, outsource.

Almost all of a government's functionality should be virtual... Well, maybe I will make a separate post about that, sometime.

Meanwhile, a little more time has been bought. The Economist remarks that

the biggest risk to the euro zone is that its leaders will begin thinking that they've solved the problem. As growth figures worsen in coming months, markets will once again become antsy. Euro-zone officials had better be preparing for a way to convince them anew that they want this thing to work.

And I go back to the pattern I established last winter, of exercise and education

This morning I spent 45 minutes trying to pound a few modern Greek words and phrases into an aging memory; until a month ago, this would have required a major effort of willpower, but lately I've been doing it every day with no problem...

As I commented to my son's mother-in-law, see-gah-see-gah mah-THAY-no, which I think means "little by little I'm learning;" since her response was "bravo, Tom, ah-krih-VOS!" (precisely), maybe it does. And maybe I will eventually learn some economics too. Or then again, maybe not.

It's all about healthcare. Well, and signaling.

This afternoon I was sitting in the third row, right behind the woman who placed the winning bid -- $13,000 -- on the auction of Harry Potter's bow tie. Well, of J. Pierpont Finch's bow tie, Finch being the lead character of How to Succeed in Business Without Really Trying; Finch is played by Daniel Radcliffe, a talented young actor/singer/dancer (well, a bit weaker as a dancer, I thought, but I'm no judge) who will probably be plagued for the rest of his life by people who can't help but think of him as Harry Potter. And he and his co-star were trying to raise money for a Good Cause, namely healthcare, after the performance. (Okay, a specific healthcare cause, but I'm still fussing about healthcare in general.) So....

So I would call the winning bid rather impressive; I think most people would. Radcliffe commented that we were "well over the record", some time before the auction closed---I presume he does this with a fresh bow tie for each performance. But I couldn't help but be reminded of the cost of my own appendectomy, not quite a year ago: it was in fact a little over the bow tie's price. Consider what that audience pays for healthcare each year...the auction was a Good Thing to Do, an Exercise in Nobility, a demonstration of the Brotherhood of Man (that being the last song&dance) but as a contribution to healthcare it was a teaspoonful in a lake.

Yes, I understand that's not the point. It's not really about healthcare, even healthcare is not really about healthcare. Robin Hanson put it rather well, some time ago, in his argument that it's about Showing That You Care:

I can explain these puzzles moderately well by assuming that humans evolved deep medical habits long ago in an environment where people gained higher status by having more allies, honestly cared about those who remained allies, were unsure ... These ancient habits would induce modern humans to treat medical care as a way to show that you care. Medical care provided by our allies would reassure us of their concern, and allies would want you and other allies to see that they had pay enough to distinguish themselves from posers who didn’t care as much as they.

That makes sense to me as the beginning of a model, and it certainly isn't a criticism of the woman who paid so much for the bow tie. She evidently does care, and presumably cares that it's evident that she cares, and that's a good thing.

Nonetheless, if you want to use healthcare provision to show you care, I think it would be a good idea to spend some time looking for actual ways to provide actual healthcare; a few more teaspoons of water in the lake won't do it. So I'd like to go back over my proposal of a bit more than a year ago. I'd organize it a bit differently now, but I don't seem to have moved all that far.

If I were (heaven forfend) In Charge, I would crowd-source as much as possible of the decision-making by pushing it into a market, with participants being given as much data for decision-making as possible, and being simultaneously milked for as much data as possible. I want incentives for innovation, to reduce the death-rate for billions yet unborn; I also want incentives for good performance now, not for the sort of regulatory capture our current system maximizes. Specifically I would:

1. Allow unlicensed health care, wherever it's clearly labeled as such; it won't get public support but people can choose to spend their money on it. The argument against this is apparently that people will make bad choices. Yeah, some will, probably including me and you. So? I've never understood the way some people believe that they (or those they select) can make good choices for others; in fact I'm moderately cynical about licensure requirements as they are now structured, whether for medics or morticians or cosmetologists.
2. Require transparent pricing, uniform no-bargaining pricing, from all providers of licensed health care. (The services producing my appendectomy really don't do this.)
3. Require that "licensing" be independent of geography; if the best/cheapest supplier of a particular treatment is two states over or on another continent, that's fine. As I've said before, I believe that telepresence medicine can enable the specialization and trade that has made markets work in other contexts since before Adam Smith wrote about it, so I expect this as the usual case, not an exception.
4. Take away the employer-based tax exemption; health care shouldn't be an employment issue.
5. Add a universal tax-funded "insurance" policy (insulation, actually): if your expenditures for "proven procedures" from licensed health care providers exceed the overall 16% (of GDP) average, then the taxpayers contribute some. Maybe if your cost is 30% of your income, then the taxpayers kick in (30-16)/2=7%, half of the overage, and the maximum you can pay is 50% of your income whether that's $0/year or $10M/year. Is that too generous? Not enough? I dunno. The point is to combine protection from catastrophe (but not from serious pain) with making sure that market prices are set by people or groups who are actually bargaining in that market, i.e. the better-off people for whom procedure X will not be covered. I want to do that combination with some simple, less-than-perfect-but-better-than-nothing rule with which I can trust a government. (Democrats and Republicans trust government on different things; just figure you want a better-than-nothing rule with which you'd trust a politician of the party you despise.)
6. If you want "unproven procedures" and you can pay for them, that's fine too; the licensed health care providers should have a strong motive to come up with new stuff and document/publish that it works. The FDA should not be able to keep you from paying for these likely-to-fail treatments, but it should keep you from charging it to the rest of us. If procedure X has no accepted studies supporting it, then it's up to you to pay for it.
7. Whatever additional insurance/insulation you want to buy for proven or unproven procedures is just fine, and can be bought across state lines. It's your problem. You want to save your money in a special bank account? Feel free.
8. Any care that has been paid or partly paid by public funds goes into an anonymized public database, so that we learn more about which treatments have what effects on which conditions. Organizations promoting not-yet-approved treatments will be encouraged to contribute data.

And that's really it, for me. I'm even less confident of this than I was when I wrote the first version, but I still don't see anything else I like as well. I think that the market I'm describing would probably evolve rather quickly into a market in which people choose and buy packaged health plans from "insurance" agents, and web sites build up crowd-sourced ratings of those health plans; there would be quite a bit of overlap with the better parts of what we have now. I hope. And I care, and I suppose I'd like to signal that I care.

Or then again, maybe not.

update:I never actually mentioned that this post was prompted by thinking about Mark Thoma's Economist's View: Discussion Question: How Can We Reduce the Growth of Health Care Costs?

there is far too much discussion of cutting services, and not enough about how to control costs without affecting services (e.g., using the government's purchasing power to reduce the amount the government pays for drugs, reducing the cost of insurance companies fighting over who pays bills, etc.)

You see, I doubt the premise: if you use government power as I believe Thoma wants, you are increasing the incentives for regulatory capture, crony capitalism, rent-seeking... you are putting yourself on a path where you have signaled your concern but healthcare is not what you're rewarding. Of course government power needs to be used -- to collect the money for treatments which research results say are crucial and which markets say are expensive. And government power needs to be used to maintain a context for innovation (rather than squelch it, as I believe our recent trends in "intellectual property" law tend to do.) But if bargaining-on-prices-with-the-government is the multi-billion$ activity you focus on, then that's what companies will have to invest in. That's a bad bad bad bad thing. I commented here.

Well, it's Easter morning. Maybe we're all saved?

Or then again, maybe not.

Yeah, the Fed Did It.

(More precisely, the Fed aggravated it; the Fed could have prevented most of it; the extent to which we depend on the Fed's good judgment should shrink, not grow.)

I believe we've been having a three-component economic crisis, each component building on and worse than the one before it, with overambitious or overconfident regulators/legislators making each component far worse than it needed to be. The three components I see are

• the trend-following housing (and financial services) bubble, which the Fed worsened slightly by false reassurances;
• the security-seeking, trend-breaking cash crunch which the Fed worsened greatly by too-tight monetary policy;
• the longer-run tech-based employment recalculation. (All right, the Fed is not guilty here but it mostly hasn't happened yet, and our sensitivity to the mistakes the Fed made this time is growing with time. Cheer up, the worst is yet to come.)

bubble: I've commented on the housing bubble before, and how I think it was worsened by regulators and legislators (and raters) who denied the problem. Investor irrationality was real, but part of that irrationality was the willingness of investors to trust pronouncements by Greenspan and Bernanke, by Barney Frank and others on both sides of the aisle, and of course their willingness to believe that AAA meant "safe". I'm not arguing that interest rates were or weren't too low. (I do not believe that was the problem.) I'm not saying that the regulators were (or are, or will be) stupid or malevolent. I am saying that they were, quite obviously, wrong, and that those who relied on their assurances did very badly. (Those who simply said "prices are rising, I'll bet everything I can borrow that the trend will continue" did exactly as badly; there are always some of those.) I'd fix that (following Arnold Kling) mainly by going back to a world of high down payments. You could still give 100% financing if you wanted, but any federal support (including FDIC guarantees for a bank that offers mortgages) should depend on at least 20% down payment. Leverage would shrink generally, and underwater mortgages would be extremely rare. This would reduce homeownership rates, of course, and that may be regrettable, but it's not obvious that people are helped by encouraging them to make commitments they are likely to break, or be broken by. Of course this version of Kling's reform won't happen; what we're getting instead is expanded trust in that which failed before, to which we add taxpayers having to guarantee more than 95% of mortages, still being pushed on those who can't afford them.

cash crunch: As I've said before, I've become a semi-Sumnerite:

the real problem right now is not a “real” problem. The real problem is a nominal problem. When the growth rate of nominal GDP falls sharply there is always a severe recession. We have a severe nominal shock, a problem which has been understood by economists at least as far back as Hume. At the time, it always looks like the “real problem” was some symptom of the monetary shock, such as financial panic. Thus in the 1930s people thought the collapsing financial system caused the Great Depression, only later did we discover it was too little money.

Investors' efforts to minimize individual risk ended up adding to systemic risk. Actually it seems to me that we knew by February 2008, when Roubini said,

"Cash is king in 2008,"... the U.S. went into recession in December and will stay there for at least a year.

The Federal Reserve under Bernanke ignored what Bernanke had written academically; it brought down interest rates and then declared a "liquidity trap". It did expand the monetary base, but not nearly enough to satisfy demand -- and they neutralized part of their monetary expansion in fall 2008, by paying interest on excess reserves, encouraging hoarding by banks. Cash remained king, mostly because people were worried about too much risk in their portfolios. Here I would agree with Sumner that we should target NGDP (nominal GDP, aggregate cash flow) but I worry that buying Treasury bonds with cash, exchanging one low-risk item for another, might not succeed; we need to cope with people trying to shed risk. The Fed's purchases of mortgage-backed securities seems like a really bad idea: this is not absorbing risk in the sense of variability, it's buying a bet that already failed and attempting to prop up a market that should go downwards because there are too many houses out there for a while. So,

• I'd make NGDP measures tradable in the form of Shiller's trills, creating a permanent market growing to perhaps a billion trills, paying one-tenth of one percent of our GDP, owned by citizens or foreigners but not by our own government.
• Like Sumner, I would announce that we're targeting a 5% growth trend in trill yield (i.e., in NGDP), based on the pre-2008 trend so that if it rises too fast or too slow in one year we compensate the next; this is "level targeting".
• I would give the Fed a stock-bonds-cash portfolio to be rebalanced daily, where the cash can be effectively imaginary (set it at last year's NGDP, most will never be printed) and all stocks are treated equally via a Wilshire Index fund; this rebalancing portfolio is the key difference between me and everybody else, hence probably totally wrong, but it makes sense to me. If investors starts selling stocks, the Fed will automatically buy, or sell if everyone else is buying, so this couple-of-trillion portfolio would automatically tend to stabilize the market. It would probably make money for taxpayers, too.
• How would it stabilize the NGDP trend? When trills (next year's trills; buy them now!) start to fall, the Fed would change the portfolio proportions, giving cash for stocks and perhaps bonds, absorbing risk and satisfying the demand for cash. When trills start to rise above the price level target, the Fed portfolio proportions would change back.
• Actually, I might make this last item more indirect: I might start a prediction market on the proportions required to achieve the actual NGDP target. In effect, I'd be giving knowledgeable parties something to bet on, so that they'd make money by getting it right. I don't want them able to make money by betting on the actual cash value of a trill's annual yield: that's (2008 yield)*(1.05^N), so the "right answer" is known in advance. Bet on the unknown path to that, instead. The Fed would use this prediction market to guide the proportions.

Instead of this, of course, we're giving the Fed a more complex mission as if its people had enhanced credibility. Since their credibility with me has gone way down, I don't find this reassuring.

employment recalculation: Kling talks about recalculation, reallocation of resources including labor in the constant search for "sustainable patterns of specialization and trade", and the unemployment this causes. Sumner acknowledges that some recalculation was required at the beginning, but mostly he just means the structural issues of too big a housing sector (and finance.) Delong and Krugman point to aggregate-demand-based unemployment and say that structural unemployment is on the way, but not yet a big deal. (Of course current unemployment is made worse by underwater mortgages which keep people from moving where the jobs are, and therefore by low-down-payment policies. And it's made directly worse by the cash crunch which motivates companies to sit on their cash, and it's made worse by regulatory uncertainty (and especially health care) and inflation uncertainty. But this is talking about aggregate demand v. structural, with recalculation as part of a slightly different story.)

I'd agree with them all, mostly, but add that recalculation is growing as an issue in a way they haven't (to my knowledge) discussed. My feeling is that overall technological productivity will gradually become the biggest factor in continuing unemployment, in the sensitivity of unemployment rates to (failures in) NGDP trends. I think that our increasing wealth and productivity means that a sharply decreasing fraction of the population is generating stuff we actually need, and a less-sharply decreasing fraction of the population is generating stuff we think we need. When money-trends continue, this doesn't matter because people buy whatever they were planning to buy. When money-trends fail and people want to hide their money, only the essentials keep going and that's a shrinking part of the economy. In the long run, (almost?) all production of goods and services is optional. In the short-to-medium run it would be enough to have the Fed do its job, making sure money-trends continue so people are comfortable buying stuff they want, not just what they think they need. In the long run, we will also need a negative income tax.

My approach to this stuff would be even more drastic, and therefore more unlikely, than my approaches to the preceding problems. So I won't finish this part of this post.

Footnote, since this is stuff that wasn't part of the way I thought through 2008: Aggregate cash flow is NGDP, Nominal Gross Domestic Product, the sum of all the money we pay (or get paid) for all the goods and services we use (and produce). You can divide that by your best guess at an inflation multiplier to get "Real GDP", the theoretical "constant-dollar" value of all those goods and services, but your paycheck and mortgage payment and grocery bill are paid in actual nominal cash flowing around and around, keeping our individual financial plans going by fulfilling the promises that we need to make economics ("sustainable patterns of specialization and trade", as per Arnold Kling) work. If expected NGDP drops, then you're already in a recession. I didn't really follow this argument when Tyler Cowen first recommended Sumner's blog. In the end, it's not that complicated. Think of a zillion spreadsheets carrying business plans and personal plans forward a few years, each projecting current trends. Aggregate cash flow -- that's "Nominal GDP". NGDP. Money. Some of those spreadsheets, some of those plans, will fail and others do better than expected, but generally the aggregate cash flow rises each year as population goes up, as productivity goes up, and as inflation goes on. If it falls or rises a little away from the expected trend implicit in all those individual plans, we adapt. If it falls sharply below trend, then cash isn't going around as expected and plans start failing simply because cash isn't going around: businesses fail and it's not their fault. Things are broken. We have a recession, a bad one.

In fact, people act by plans and promises, betting on their projections, so we get a recession as soon as the expected NGDP growth fails so that people stop buying and employers stop hiring.

Q: That sort of sounds almost convincing. Very odd. But isn't the future causing the present here?

A: Gee, thank you. It's actually close to tautological: expected NGDP is the aggregate of expected cash flow, and your belief that you're no longer going to be able to buy the goods and services you expected to buy will immediately change your behavior, the recession hits as soon as you expect it. So it's your beliefs about the future causing your behavior in the present.

In the current case we had a small recession because a whole lot of investors had believed our regulators and legislators who downplayed the risks of the bubble. They -- the investors -- had believed in the AAA ratings. When they hit reality they bounced, and needed more cash.

Q: But is this the Fed's fault? I mean, apart from Greenspan and then Bernanke denying the bubble?

A: The Fed has a dual mandate: they are supposed to manage inflation and unemployment, by managing the money supply. I'm saying that I mostly believe Sumner: the Fed did expand money somewhat, but they could have avoided most of the pain we've felt if they'd done more. So yeah, it's their fault.

Q: Done more? Done what? Lowered interest rates below zero?

A: Well, first by not paying interest on (excess) reserves, which was and is contractionary. Second, by announcing an inflation target or better an NGDP level-targeting sequence. Third, by expanding their open market purchases; preferably by starting the kind of automatically daily-rebalancing portfolio I described above.

Q: I understand why paying interest on reserves is contractionary; why are they doing it?

A: I don't really understand, but I think it's simply a way to give the banks money so they don't fail, while pretending that it's not Main Street bailing out Wall Street. I'm getting very cynical in my old age.

Ryan Avent of the Economist said

It's getting ever more difficult to avoid concluding that the Fed's inflation target is not the 2% we'd all come to expect, but something much closer to zero. This obviously impacts economic behaviour. The Fed could potentially have a significant effect on conditions simply by letting markets know that it's not actually happy with the current inflation trajectory.

Recently (Sept 2010) Bernanke has said that, with good effect; let's hope he goes further. There's some evidence that it will happen, e.g. Calculated Risk's Fed's Lockhart: The Approaching Monetary Policy Decision Dilemma

I think a consensus is building for QE2 in early November.

But I don't trust Bernanke to follow through, or at least I don't trust the Fed he leads...and that's what it depends on.

Or then again (I hope), maybe not.

Update: I see Avent saying in The perils of prediction: Forget forecasts, trust markets | The Economist that

I like to point out that in June of 2008 the Federal Reserve forecast real GDP growth in 2009 of 2.0% to 2.8%, when in fact the economy shrank in 2009 by over 2%. Of course, this doesn't mean that central banks have no basis on which to make policy. All they need do is look at the evidence in front of them. Markets...

I trust markets a lot more than I trust the Fed.

Perhaps I should note that Sumner does not blame the Fed for failure to predict, as he said in TheMoneyIllusion » The Fed doesn’t have a crystal ball

All the major investment banks with their million dollar Ivy League employees missed this crisis (and its eventual impact), and yet the Fed was supposed to have predicted it? The Fed pays much lower salaries than Wall Street.

Indeed, I wouldn't blame the Fed for the housing bubble recession-trigger at all if Greenspan (and then Bernanke) had simply said "Bubble-detection is not part of my job, I can't help you with that." But this is not what I understood them to be saying.

update: Ah-ha! An actual reputable economist, Nick Rowe, says at least that

If I had my druthers, the Fed would buy stocks. Something like the S&P500 index.

This is not equivalent to saying that the Fed should do a large part of its monetary policy via a rebalancing portfolio somewhat similar to what investment people prescribe for individuals, but it's a start. Yay!

(Or then again, maybe not.)

upd: The same Nick Rowe is quoted approvingly by Brad Delong in Against Money-Financed Fiscal Expansion, For Open Market Operations in Equity Indexes

OK. Start with the Fed buying bridges. That will work. Now, wouldn't it be nice if the Fed could also sell those bridges again later, if it needs to, as it probably will. Bridges aren't very liquid. And, the Fed is good at clipping coupons on bonds, but perhaps not very experienced at collecting tolls on bridges. Hmmm. Maybe if the Fed just bought shares in bridges instead, that would be as good as bridges, but even better from the practical point of view. Hmmm. Why stop at bridges? Why not buy shares in everything? Why not just buy the Wilshire 5000, or some such index?

Excellent. The right index identified, along with the need for later sale; we are close to portfolio rebalancing.

Rodrik on Development

I've been reading Dani Rodrik's blog and now his current book, One Economics, Many Recipes. He is lots more enthusiastic about government than I am, and mostly I feel battered in that he is mostly making a good case for stuff that I'd rather not believe: sometimes interventionist government works better than minimalist government. This makes my worldview more complicated than -- as a laygeek interested in economics and specifically in development economics -- I want it to be. I see in Arnold Kling's review that he (albeit not a laygeek) feels more or less the same way, which is not a big surprise -- my views often overlap with his.

However, I'm still feeling bothered by the book's start, right on page 1 of the Introduction:

ON A VISIT to a small Latin American country a few years back, my colleagues and I paid a courtesy visit to the minister of finance...a detailed PowerPoint presentation on his economy's recent progress...listed all the reforms...Trade barriers had been removed, price controls had been lifted, and all public enterprises had been privatized. Fiscal policy was tight, public debt levels low, and inflation nonexistent. Labor markets were as flexible as they come. There were no exchange or capital controls, and the economy was open to foreign investments of all kind. [sic] "We have done all the first-generation reforms, all the second-generation reforms, and are now embarking on...

...Alas...The economy was scarcely growing, private investment remained depressed...poverty and inequality were on the rise. What had gone wrong?

This opening created, for me, a tension for which I have not yet seen a resolution in the book; I'm not nearly done, but I don't see it indicated in Kling's review either, or when I follow up the obvious terms -- "corruption", "transparency", "bureaucracy" -- in the index. It sounds to me as if Rodrik is reporting that the minister of finance told him they'd done all the reforms...except for reform.

[[personal background: I grew up largely in Latin America, with a dad who was trying to assist businesses large and small, from the early 60s when he ran the Veracruz shipyard for Baltimore Shipbuilding and Drydock, the mid-60s lumber mill in Nicaragua, the late 60s and 70s as a "project engineer" for dams and road and shipyards for the Interamerican Development Bank in Colombia, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay, and so on to his death in the late 80s; he was always trying on the side to help little businesses get going. (This was his peculiar version of Quakerism.) He kept saying he was going to write a book about Latin America's failures, but I think in the end it would have been a less abstract, more dramatized version of parts of De Soto's Mystery of Capital but without de Soto's central real-estate insight; it was all about corruption, lack of transparency, and bureaucracy.]]

I look at Transparency International's corruption perceptions map and wonder which Latin American country Rodrik could be talking about: Chile is pretty good and Uruguay is not bad, but Chile's been growing pretty fast (and is pretty big, anyway) and Uruguay isn't privatized, so I guess by my standards (especially in the light of Uruguay's poor commercial (small-biz) characteristics) their respective growth patterns, and those of their neighbors, are not terribly surprising.

I remember Dad talking in 1970 about helping somebody set up a small export (leatherwork) business in Montevideo; the basic forms took more than a year, stopping at several dozen desks, even with him pushing them along as if the IDB (or BID, if you speak Spanish) thought they were important. Without that help they would have simply failed -- not necessarily from corruption, but from bureaucracy.

That's been my model of Latin American government all my life: any given government will have a lot of honest people in it, but the net effect will usually range from actively predatory down to parasitic, with the exception of Chile. (Mexico is not an exception, but has benefited and suffered in various ways from proximity to the US -- I'm thinking of legal immigration, illegal immigration, and the drug trade as well as legal trade and a few invasions.)

I'm not saying that government has to be a baleful influence. In the US, my plumber is a business, the carpenter is a business... -- I'm a business and a half (half of a partnership) duly registered for small fees with the county clerk. The Small Business Administration and Federation of Small Businesses are not perfect, but my feeling is that they are actually pretty good. The US overall has a pro-growth government, in many ways, and I'm fairly comfortable with that kind of interventionism -- but mostly that's a kind of interventionism that has to do with constantly adjusting the regulatory barriers that keep businesses from getting too predatory, rather than assisting them (and bureaucrats) in being predatory. I do get muchly less comfortable when it tries to intervene in favor of specific industries, areas, companies, people -- there you get massively harmful rent-seeking as with our agricultural subsidies. Still, there are some government interventions which may make sense, and Rodrik argues effectively. Mostly.

However, I'm not comfortable with Rodrik's starting point; it struck me as pretty strange.

(Well, maybe not.)